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In January 1970 Indonesian student organizations took to the 
Djakarta streets to protest corruption in their government. It was 
the strongest anti-corruption outburst in the 25-year history of the 
Republic and threatened to upset the political stability which 
President Suharto had sought to establish as a basis for national 
economic growth. Special troops from the Army handled the immediate 
challenge, but as a longer term palliative the President appointed a 
special Commission of Four (Komisi IV) to review the problem and 
make concrete suggestions for improvement.
For several months the Commission held hearings in executive 
session and sifted through charges and evidence pertaining to corrupt 
practices while the press, students, and national political figures 
expressed their own views.1 Subsequently, in his annual Independence 
Day speech to the nation, the President reviewed the recommendations 
of the Commission and boldly stated that, "There should no longer be 
any doubts about it. I myself will lead the fight against corrup­
tion."2
This personal statement partially succeeded in defusing the 
issue, enabling the regime to turn its resources away from short- 
run political problems and back to longer-run economic policy con­
siderations. But given the pervasive nature of the problem, corruption 
is certain to be a recurring issue. This article attempts to explain 
Indonesian corruption and in so doing, to review the kind of demands 
it makes on a regime preoccupied with the primary objectives of staying 
in power and promoting economic growth.
As applied here, the term "corruption" refers to the use of public 
resources for private purposes. This definition covers not only con­
ventional monetary, but also political and administrative corruption 
as well. An administrator who exploits his position to extract un­
official payments from investors (either foreign or domestic) is using
1. The presidential adviser to the Commission, former Vice-President 
Hatta, was quoted as saying that, "Corruption has become an 
Indonesian art," and that it is a "part of the culture." Indonesian 
Observer, July 2 , 1970 , p. 1. Half-humorously, a columnist for
the Djakarta Times suggested that the Ministry of Education and 
Culture establish a division for corrpution, presumably in its 
Directorate General for Culture. July 3, 1970, p. 1.
2. "Address of State by the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
Before the House of Representatives on the Eve of the 25th 
Independence Day,” August 16, 1970, Djakarta, p. 28.
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a public resource--his official position, prestige, status, and/or 
authority--for personal profit. Likewise, an official who appoints 
family and friends to lucrative government positions regardless of 
their abilities is using a public resource for private gain.
Corruption can be categorized in various other ways. One type 
of classification might use scale, starting with large manipulations 
at the top and descending to "speed money" and gifts of cigarettes 
at the bottom.3 This could lead to a useful qualitative distinction 
between high level and low level corruption, both within a single 
government organization and across various levels of the governmental 
system--national, provincial, district, sub-district and village.
A second kind of classification might distinguish types of re­
source (diversion according to the method employed by the perpetra­
tors . There are some officials who directly divert funds which are 
under their control, while others use their official authority to com­
mand unofficial payments from private parties seeking special privileges 
or governmental assistance. The former is stealing and constitutes 
a direct loss of state financial resources. The latter is bribery and 
represents the loss of a different kind of resource, the government's 
legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of some critical elite groups 
such as professionals, academics, students, and civil servants.
Bribes may account for significant financial losses to the state as 
well, since they frequently represent private payments in lieu of 
official tax or licensing obligations. In their present anti-corrup­
tion campaign, Indonesia's leaders seem to favor this distinction, 
and their statements indicate that they are primarily concerned with 
the first kind of deviation. At first glance this choice appears 
to be a case of misplaced priorities , but administrative convenience 
and "reach" probably governed the choice: far fewer people are in­
volved in outright stealing than in bribery.
A third system of classification deals with the targets of cor­
rupt practices. Regional economic planners from all of Indonesia's 
26 provinces listed the following kinds of corruption:
TABLE I
Responses of 54 Regional Economic Planners to the 
Question: "What kind of corruption is most
damaging to economic development?"3
Type of Target Identified
Planners
Number
Noting Kind 
Percent
Monetary corruption (including commissions) 28 55
Corruption of time 14 28
Misuse of government authority or position 14 28
All kinds of corruption 9 18
"Stealing" or unauthorized use of government
equipment and materials 9 18
Corruption at high levels 4 8
Other kinds of corruption 5 10
a. The data are based on the author's survey of provincial economic 
planners in August 1969.
3. "Speed money," or "lubricating money" (uang semir) as it is called
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This last classification is especially useful for two reasons. First, 
officials are interested in this classification and are willing to 
discuss it, thereby eliminating a major methodological problem for 
research. Second, such a breakdown can inform policy makers of the 
kinds of problems troubling particular constituencies, thus clarifying 
possible decision areas for government leaders.
Causes of Corruption
Historical Variables
Furnivall has written that the Netherlands Indies was practically 
free of corruption.1 *4 While this view is corrobated by many Indonesians 
living today who are prone to credit the Japanese occupation govern­
ment with introducing corruption, there is a wealth of evidence to 
show that it is incorrect. Prior to 1800, the Dutch East India Company 
offered Indonesians flagnant examples of corrupt behavior. In the 
words of Clive Day, the men of the Company "were underpaid and ex­
posed to every temptation that was offered by the combination of a 
weak native organization, extraordinary opportunities in trade, and 
an almost complete absence of checks from home or in Java. . . . 
Officials became rich by stealing from the company. Some forms of 
theft came in time to deserve a less harsh name, as they were so 
current and open that they could be regarded as legal."5
From the writings of Raffles and the numerous colonial reports 
cited by Day, it is clear that the demise of Company rule and the 
arrival of the Dutch Governor General at the turn of the nineteenth 
century resulted in an unavoidable widening of illicit practices. As 
colonial regulation and control expanded, both European and native 
officials indulged in obvious abuses, enjoying not only the specified 
percentage which was their right, but also a portion of most re­
sources passing through their hands. When traditional services and 
payments due the native aristocratic officials were abolished in 
favor of Dutch-paid salaries, native officials had no alternative 
but to use illegal means if they wished to maintain the state of 
life to which they were accustomed.6 Other aristocratic {prijaji) 
Javanese bribed their way into remunerative positions dispensed by 
Dutch officials.7 And with the expansion of Dutch taxation on the
in Indonesia, is a small bribe offered on the assumption that
some permission or necessary governmental action will either be
waived or disposed of more quickly.
4. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative
Study of Burma and Netherlands India (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1957) , p . 269.
5. Clive Day, The Dutch in Java (London: Oxford University Press, 
1966) , pp. 100-103.
6. Ibid., pp. 299-300.
7. See John Smail's sections on Indonesian history in David J.
Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History
(New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 147.
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land and its produce, native officials as low as village headmen and 
their assistants took advantage of new opportunities for profiteering. 
In Java, "Some ibekel (tax farmers) raised twenty-fold what they paid 
to their superiors. Their devices for extortion were innumerable."8 
In West Sumatra, village adat (customary law) leaders "frequently had 
to be dismissed for fraud."9 Just as stealing from the Dutch East 
India Company in the eighteenth century came to be overlooked, so too, 
minor forms of extortion by native officials grew to be tolerated.
"The little man never makes open complaint," said a native witness 
when asked about gross abuses during an 1850 investigation.10
Part of the difficulty in reaching agreement on the incidence of 
corruption during the colonial period is definitional. For example, 
the use of tax revenue for personal purposes, which may have been 
much commoner in pre-independence times, did not wholly violate the 
prijaji conscience. Soemarsaid Moertono, writing about statecraft 
in the Later Mataram Period (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries), pro­
vides good clues as to the type of administrative culture which the 
Dutch encountered in Java:
The maintenance of a department, office or institution 
was left wholly to the ability and moral considerations 
of the office-holder, a fact quite in harmony with a 
state organization in which personal authority played 
such a dominating role.
And further:
The finance system of Later Mataram can be called "salary- 
financing," for out of the salary which the official 
earned (entirely in the form of appanages called lungguh) 
he was expected to pay all the expenses entailed in the 
performance of his tasks and duties.11
In short, traditionally there was little differentiation between 
public and private money.
But subsequently, particularly with the rise of nationalism 
and the achievement of an Indoneisan state, claims to state resources 
increasingly became public claims and the private use of what were
8. Day, Dutch in Java, p. 33.
9. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies (The Hague: W. Van 
Hoeve, 1955), I, p. 137.
10. Day, Dutch in Java, p. 307.
11. Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study
of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1963), pp. 90 and 134. Many of these 
tasks and duties were social ones, and present cultural norms 
dictate that they still be performed today. But in modern, ra­
tional-legal terms, the use of government money for these func­
tions is often considered corruption. Only a very few top offi­
cials receive budgetary subsidies for this purpose.
25
now "public" funds became "corruption." Thus, the expansion of cor­
ruption in Indonesia, as in other new states, constitutes, in part, 
a new definition of corrupt practices rather than a change in tradi­
tional behavior. In the well-chosen words of Wertheim, ". . . a  
kind of public conduct hitherto considered normal was now looked 
at with other, more critical eyes."12 13
Another link between corruption and nationhood stems from 
revolutionary leaders' perceptions of the function of the state.
In nearly all cases, and particularly in the case of Indonesia during 
the Guided Democracy period (1958-1965), the government's role in 
society--political, economic, and administrative--expanded very 
considerably. With this expansion came many new possibilities for 
corruption and bribery involving public officials.
These two points which link the rise of corruption as an issue 
with the early years of nationhood are not earthshaking, but they 
provide a corrective to Myrdal's uncritically gloomy assertion that 
corruption in post-independence Asia is increasing. 3 Points of 
reference are important. For example, relative to the growth in 
personnel and functions which national bureaucracies have under­
gone, corruption may not in fact be "increasing."
Cultural Variables
For hundreds of years much of Java was effectively ruled by 
aristocrats who, as representatives of the kings, enjoyed patrimonial 
privileges not unlike those found in feudal Europe. Princely and 
regency offices were often hereditary and a percentage of crop 
yields was due their incumbents, as were domestic services known 
as vantjen. Daendels' attempt to instil the Napoleonic concept 
of government in Java faltered under the impact of the Java War 
(1825-1830), but eventually made headway at the end of the nine­
teenth century when many traditional privileges were reduced at 
all governmental levels, except at the base of Javanese civil 
administration, the village. Here no distinction was made between 
money that went to the treasury and that which did not; non-salaried 
village headmen collected taxes, paid themselves whatever they felt 
they deserved and used the remainder for the village needs. This 
practice was completely in harmony with patrimonial values.
In many Javanese villages this pattern has changed only slightly 
since independence. This means that for the villager who rises to
12. W. F. Wertheim, "Sociological Aspects of Corruption in Southeast 
Asia,” in East-West Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern
Asia (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1964), pT 111. This point has 
been elaborated upon by James C. Scott in, "The Analysis of Cor­
ruption in Developing Nations," Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 2, No. 3 (June 1969), pp. 318-319.
13. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Pantheon, 1968), II, 
p. 944.
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the level of district or subdistrict officer today, traditionally 
accepted behavior and values suddenly become legally corrupt behavior 
and values. Since a majority of today's Indonesian civil servants 
were born and raised in villages and undoubtedly carried (and still 
carry) many of these traditional values into office with them, this 
normative conflict has an important bearing on bureaucratic behavior.^
TABLE II
Place of Birth and Childhood Residence of a 
Sample of Regional Officials by Class®
Class of Civil Servant Place of Birth
Age 1 to 12 Lived 
Mostly in:
Village City*3 Village City
Economic Planners 32 22 30 24
Higher Level Officials 96 61 74 82
Lower Level Officials 83 62 73 72
Subdistrict Officers 202 52 171 83
Totals 413 (68%) 197 (32%) 348 (57%) 261 (43%)
a. The 54 regional economic planners surveyed are those referred to 
on page 22. The "Higher Level” (salary grade III and IV) and 
"Lower Level" (salary grade II) civil servants in the sample hold 
jobs in the provincial capitals of West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, 
and Central Java. They were drawn in approximately equal numbers 
from the Departments of Home Affairs, Finance, Education/Culture, 
and Public Works. The Subdistrict Officers, or Tjamat, were drawn 
from the same three provinces. This data and that in the following 
tables was obtained between October 1969 and April 1970.
b. City refers to kotamadya, which is the Indonesian equivalent of 
municipality. Though not based strictly on population, there are 
few large towns which are not accorded this status.
As Table II reveals, a clear majority of a representative sample 
of regional officials were born in and grew up in villages, indicating 
a strong potential link with the patrimonial value-system described so 
well by Geertz.14 5 While there is no good comparative data to show 
differences in Indonesian rural and urban values, powerful residues 
of patrimonial value structures can be found in most multi-generation 
urban dwellers. Thus the lack of congruence between civil servant
14. B. Soesarso, Korupsi di Indonesia (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1969), 
especially Chapter 10, "Redefinition of Morality."
15. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press, 
1960), Chapter 17.
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values and legal-rational bureaucratic norms may be even more general 
than the data on place of birth and childhood suggest.
While the data and explanations presented above are not intended 
as an apology for corruption, they do go far to explain the dilemma 
faced by many government officials. Schooled in traditional village 
values, many of them entered the government directly at the time of 
Independence without benefit of value-changing higher education.
Today they are either burdened with (sustained by?) these traditional 
values or else find themselves in a situation of increasing moral 
disorientation.
An understanding of the continuing significance of the tradi­
tional .value system in Java also helps to explain why anti-corruption 
drives rarely proceed very far. Java's administrative culture is 
built around "a very intense concern for status: for smooth, con­
strained, hyperpolite behavior."16 To make direct charges of corrupt 
practices against individuals engenders a disagreeable, open conflict 
situation. It threatens a man's livelihood and status, that of his 
family, his staff, and possibly that of his organization. It may 
even go beyond that. Like a thread that begins to unravel, the 
exposure of malpractices by one official may lead to the order- 
shattering implication of several others not even under suspicion. 
David Mitchell has suggested that most officials in the district 
which he studied were complicit in each others' corrupt practices 
(tahu-sama-tahu), and a recent case in the Central Java regency of 
Wonogiri offers a clear example of how this system sometimes works.17 
For the typical Javanese, the psychic costs of direct interpersonal 
conflict and the dangers involved in leveling charges of corruption 
appear too high to encourage much of the aggressive behavior that is 
a sine qua non for successful anti-corruption drives.18
16. Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965) , p. 79.
17. "Wanokalada: A Case Study in Local Administration," Bulletin
of Indonesian Economic Studies, July 1970, p. 83. For a re- 
view of events in Wonogiri, see "Sidang Korupsi 5 Pedjabat
di Wonogiri," Kompas, September 9, 1970, p. 2.
18. Part of this general argument can also be found in the pub­
lished conclusions of a seminar on "Corruption and Development" 
held in Djakarta and sponsored by the Student Council of the 
University of Indonesia, August 10-12, 1970. "Inventarisasi 
Pendapat2 peserta Panel Diskusi Tentang 'Korupsi dan 
Pembangunan'" (mimeo). Seminar panelists explained the 
failure of the Indonesian public openly to criticize officials 
who are widely known to be involved in Corrupt practices as 
follows: "The people have extraordinary respect for someone
in authority. He is thought of as a superior and they do not 
want to take a critical attitude toward anything that he does. 
This seems to be the reason why this social stratum does not 
react to cases of corruption."
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Economic Factors
In the late 1950's, Dr. Hatta observed that, "Workers and govern­
ment employees, whose wages and salaries are no longer adequate for 
their daily needs, are being exploited by enterprising adventurers 
who want to get rich quickly. . . . Bribery and graft have become in­
creasingly common, to the detriment of our community and country.”19 
Since early colonial times, insufficient salaries for Indonesian 
officials have been a continuing problem. The following table illus­
trates the current gap between basic government salaries (including 
official supplements in rupiahs which may run as high as 100 percent 
for senior officials) and minimal monthly rupiah requirements of 
various groups of civil servants. The figures demonstrate that, 
practically speaking, there is not a single official who can live by 
his government income alone.
TABLE III (a)
A Comparison of Minimal Monthly Salary Needs 
and Official Basic Monthly Incomes by 
Classes of Civil Servants
Type of Regional 
Official
Stated Minimal 
Monthly Needs 
(Average)
Official Basic 
Monthly Income 
(Average)a
Economic Planners (54) Rp. 15,132 Rp. 8,514
Higher Level (157) 20,028 11,268
Lower Level (146) 16,434 7,050
Subdistrict Officers (226) 15,361 7,050
a. To reach this figure the following allowances were added to the 
basic salary (gadji pokok) : implementation allowance (tundjangan
pelaksanaan) , 20%; "responsibility" allowance (tundjangan djabatan), 
20%; a rice allowance of approximately Rp. 40 per kilogram at 10 
kilograms per family member; a spouse allowance of 5%; and 2% for 
each child under 18 years of age. There is then a 10% standard 
deduction in the basic salary for health insurance and pensions.
Only a minority of officials receive the "responsibility" allow­
ance, the maximum number being limited to 25% of the total employees 
in each department. The supplement is given to those in leadership 
positions, such as section and bureau heads. All officials, ex­
cept for the lowest ranking (Salary Group I) receive the implemen­
tation allowance.
As an example of the monthly salary computation, here is the case 
of an official who is a bureau head in the Governor's Office 
(South Sulawesi), has a master's degree, ten years of government
19. Mohammad Hatta, The Co-operative Movement in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 84-85.
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service, a wife and five children.
Basic Salary Rp. 5,040
Implementation allowance (20%) 1,008
"Responsibility" allowance (20%) 1,008
Rice allowance (70 kilograms x Rp. 40) 2,800
Wife allowance (5%) 252
Children allowance (2% x 5) 504
Gross Income Rp. 10,612
Healt.h/pension deduction (10%) - 504
Total government income Rp. 10,108 =
$26.95/ month
Officials in the Department of Finance receive a premi 
eac-h month (100% of their basic salaries) which adds about 
one-third to these figures and some departments have 
attached personnel incentives to their development pro­
jects- -foremost among them being the Department of Public 
Works. The figures presented do not include housing and 
vehicles which are provided for a small minority of high- 
level officials.
All of the data were gathered in the period October 1969 to 
April 1970.
The data show that official income amounts to approximately half of 
essential monthly needs. Actual monthly expenditures , a more 
accurate indicator of perceived needs, run somewhat higher but can­
not be precisely determined. However, a general picture of the 
present disparity between officials' government income and their 
expenditures is presented in Table 111(b). Salaries and bonuses 
currently amount to about one-third of the amount most officials 
say they need to sustain their families' standard of living.
TABLE 111(b)
Responses of Regional Officials to the Question: 
"How large an increase in salary would 
you need before you would decide to 
give up your extra-governmental 
jobs or before you could fulfill 
the needs of your family?"
2 Times
Class of Civil Servant or Less 3 Times 4 Times 5 Times 5+ Times
Higher Level (136) 
(Salary Grades 36|4)
35 48 23 16 14
Lower Level (126) 
(Salary Grade 2)
34 39 22 14 17
Subdistrict Officers 
(Salary Grade 2) (207)
55 57 39 31 25
Totals (469) 
Percent
104
23.2
144
32.1
84
18.7
61
13.6
56
12.4
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More than anything else, these figures reflect the disastrous effects 
which inflation has had on salaried government officials between the 
years 1958 and 1968. (In 1966 the rate of inflation was over 600 per­
cent.) Although there have been occasional salary increases, the 
latest being a 50% raise in April 1970, compensation levels still lag 
far behind price increases. While the data presented in Tables III(a) 
and 111(b) are not as "hard" as one might wish, they do illuminate the 
dilemma faced by government officials who are compelled to find addi­
tional sources of income. The figures become still more significant 
if the general lack of incentives for correct behavior by government 
officials is considered. Salary increases are very difficult to ob­
tain and truly meaningful increases may be impossible for the govern­
ment to provide at this time. Rapid promotions are rarely possible. 
Government housing and vehicles are limited to a small fraction of 
all govetnment employees. Travel and training opportunities are 
severely limited, particularly so for officials working outside 
Dj akarta.
In addition to the shortage of incentives, applicable sanctions 
are also in comparatively short supply. Cultural norms effectively 
preclude punitive denial of the perquisites, however minor, that 
attend each position. Salary increases and promotions are all but 
automatic and the difficulty in removing someone from office is re­
flected in responses to the following question asked of higher civil 
servants:
TABLE IV
Responses of 120 Higher Regional Officials to 
the Question: "If the performance of your
subordinates is poor or not good in any 
way, can you relieve them of their jobs?"
Response Number Percent
It is possible according to the regulations, 
but I have never done it. 88 73.3
Sometimes 13 10.8
Usually 19 15.8
The responses require no interpretation except to point out that the 
common procedure for dealing with officials whose corrupt practices 
become open knowledge is to transfer them to new jobs before their 
activities gain wide attention.
Key Variables Identified by Indonesian Bureaucrats
The survey data indicate that Indonesian officials view low 
salaries as the prime factor behind corrupt practices.
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But the responses indicate that they are introspective and self- 
critical of their own government's performance. About 50 percent 
of those surveyed blamed corruption on weak administration and a 
lack of effective government controls. Almost as many said civil 
servant mental attitudes were responsible. This last variable is 
not easy to unravel since the "mental attitude" (sikap mental) 
response encompasses such different concepts as traditional values, 
the lack of a public service ethic, greed, and dishonesty. Table V 
below provides a breakdown of their responses.
TABLE V
"In your opinion, what factors cause corruption?"
Corruption Causes Identified by Regional Officials 
Civil Generally Weak
Province Low Servant Poor Admin, and
(Number of Sala- Mental Economic Lack of No
Respondents) ries Attitudes Conditions Controls Other Answer
West
Sumatra (74)* 51 53 26 44 11 6
69% 72% 35% 57%
South
Sulawesi (125)* 69 50 39 58 12 12
55% 40% 31% 46%
Central
Java (104)* 51 35 35 43 17 11
49% 34% 34% 41%
Totals 171 142 100 145 40 29
(303) 56% 46% 32% 48% 13% 10%
* These figures refer to the number of officials in each provincial 
sample. Multiple responses account for percentages which total 
more than 100.
The response of a higher level official working in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs in South Sulawesi was not atypical. He suggested four 
reasons for corruption:
1. There are good opportunities for corruption.
2. It results from the general condition of the economy 
and low government salaries.
3. Our own administrative weaknesses facilitate corruption.
4. There is a lack of firmness by those who are charged 
with carrying out laws against corrupt officials with 
the result that corruption becomes a general phenomenon 
or a normal thing (jang biasa sadja). 0 20
20. Interview, December 1969.
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Structural Variables
There are obvious limitations on the reforming policy-makers' 
capacity to affect the abovementioned variables. They cannot change 
the history and culture of Indonesia, and aside from tariff, licensing 
and direct tax regulations, they have few alternatives in the economic, 
field under present conditions. However, there may be a close link 
between corruption and the kind of governmental structure which 
Indonesia has today. If this is true, then perhaps the options of 
government leaders are not as limited as they might at first appear 
to be.
Deductive reasoning suggests that a highly centralized govern­
mental structure may not only make corruption possible, but necessary. 
Five elements of this argument are outlined below.
First, extremely limited numbers of decision-making centers 
place a premium on the ability of the public to draw attention to 
their problems and to get decisions from top leaders. Decision­
makers have a seller's market. The demand for decisions, many of 
them minor in nature, is much greater than they can supply. Money 
can be, and is, used to make particularistic demands more effective. 
This is rational in some senses--payment for performance--but dis­
parities in purchasing power ensure that unequal treatment will be 
given to different publics.
Second, centralization leads to the issuance of more control 
regulations since top leaders cannot personally supervise the 
activities for which they are responsible. The multiplication of 
"preventive" controls through regulations establishes additional 
gatekeepers--officials who can extract a price at each gate. In sum, 
the more gates, the more widespread the need to use speed'money.
Third, centralization lessens the likelihood that second and 
third-level regional governments will take initiatives in combatting 
corruption. They may not have the right to issue general corrective 
regulations, and, as our survey evidence indicates, perceived cor­
ruption at the center of government is itself a strong psychological 
deterrent to positive steps at lower levels.
Fourth, the results of a series of interviews by the author 
indicate that Indonesia's top decision-makers do not know with any 
precision the degree of corruption prevailing at lower levels nor 
do they fully appreciate its impact on the general public. This is 
a result of the extent to which the upward flow of accurate informa­
tion and frank reporting is discouraged within the government. With 
only vague notions of the degree and impact of corruption below them, 
they cannot readily be expected to take positive action.
Finally, the centralized revenue policy of the Indonesian govern­
ment does little to enhance the responsibility of regional officials 
as they (the officials) perceive it. Figures for fiscal year 1969- 
1970 indicate that local and regional governments received 52.6 per­
cent of their budgets in the form of subsidies, 39.5 percent from 
revenue collections carried out by central government agencies in 
regions, and only 7.9 percent from their own efforts.21 It might
21. These problems are explored in much greater depth in R. Stafford 
Smith and Theodore M. Smith, "The Political Economy of Regional
33
fairly be hypothesized that the less governments are responsible for 
financing themselves, the less concern their officials and local 
publics will show in seeing that funds are carefully handled. Stated 
another way, one tends to take better care of one's own money than 
one does that of someone else. It therefore seems highly probably 
that decentralization of rights to raise revenue would be followed 
by increased regional and local responsibility in the use of funds.
These points may be important in a policy sense because they 
suggest that limited steps toward the decentralization of decision­
making could reduce the need for certain kinds of corruption. The 
contrary view, that increased local autonomy might, by reducing 
central control, actually result in increased corruption, has some 
plausibility. But there is a measure of irony here, since it is 
precisely some of those centralized controls which increase the need 
for corrupt behavior in the regions. Moreover, this argument rests 
on the unproven assumption that local controls would be less seriously 
enforced than central controls.
Political Party Factors
Political parties, particularly new political parties, have 
financing needs which have been only fitfully met in most low- 
income countries. Their organizational investments and their pur­
chase of support require a great deal of money, and often the only 
available means to obtain such working capital is to syphon it off 
the state. In narrow rational-bureaucratic terms this kind of 
corruption represents a serious loss. But in a broader perspective, 
it may represent unofficial investments in the political infrastruc­
ture (party development) which will open new, or strengthen estab­
lished channels of interest articulation. Indonesia's last general 
elections in 1955 witnessed successful attempts by several parties, 
particularly the PNI, to divert state resources to their own 
campaign funds.22 The line between civil service and political party 
activity has never been sharply drawn in Indonesia. Government 
Regulation No. 6 of 1970 prohibits members of the armed forces, 
officials of the Defense Department, judges, public prosecutors and 
the state bank governor from joining political organizations, but 
the bulk of the civil service is free to join. Moreover, civil ser­
vants standing for election need not resign their positions until 
they are elected and accept membership in a legislative body 
(Presidential Decision of October 26, 1970). Though some officials 
are troubled that the civil service should be involved in partisan 
politics, a series of interviews with provincial officials indicated 
that a majority of them will participate actively in the forthcoming 
July 1971 general elections.
and Urban Revenue Policy in Indonesia,” (forthcoming).
22. See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth 
McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), p. 315.
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Civil Servant and Student Responses to the 
Question: "Do you expect to join in the
upcoming general election activities?"
TABLE VI
Type of Respondent Yes 1 No %
Don't
Know
Yet %
No
Response %
Higher Level (157) 71 45.2 44 28.0 38 24.2 4 2.5
Lower Level (146) 75 51.4 34 23.3 32 21.9 5 3.4
Subdistrict
Officers (257) 129 50.2 72 28.0 45 17.5 11 4.3
University
Students (554) 249 44.9 94 17.0 203 36.6 6 1.1
The data show that, more than a year before the elections, approximate­
ly half of the sample was already committed to joining the campaigns 
in some fashion or another. In many cases this participation will 
mean the providing of office equipment, supplies, vehicles and money 
to the political organizations supported by the official.
Beyond election needs, there are the day-to-day routine expenses 
which are required to keep a party functioning. Party leaders in 
Indonesia have sought and won extra-legal commercial privileges and 
the use of government facilities to serve their income needs and they 
are likely to continue this practice; military organizations follow 
the same strategy with even greater success.23 24
Costs and Benefits of Corruption
Full credit should be given to J. S. Nye for attempting to take 
the problem of corruption out of its moral context by suggesting a 
kind of analysis that might be useful to government leaders.21* Making 
use of his and some additional criteria for measurement, one can begin 
to assess the impact of corruption on development in Indonesia. Most 
of the tentative conclusions presented are impressionistic, but some 
data on elite attitudes toward corruption in the Indonesian govern­
ment provide substance for an evaluation of political costs.
23. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Sudjoko Prasodjo and Bambang Trijoso, 
"Masalah Korupsi" (Djakarta, March 1970, mimeo), p. 14.
24. J. S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, 61 (June 
1967), pp. 417-428.
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Potential Benefits
Higher level corruption may be one means of accumulating capital. 
Assuming the possibility of this kind of corruption in Indonesia, the 
crucial question to be asked is whether or not this capital is being 
reinvested in Indonesia or being sent abroad. It is obvious that much 
of the capital is being reinvested in Indonesia. How much? We simply 
do not know, though one might be able to obtain some rough indicators 
through bank officials.
Limited enforcement of present business tax laws may allow busi­
nessmen to accumulate the necessary funds for new capital investment. 
Papanek notes in the case of Pakistan: "In practice, only 10 percent 
of actual industrial profits were collected in taxes, thus providing 
the spur and capital for industrial enterpreneurship."25 The 
Indonesian system of tax bargaining {tawar-menawar) which is carried 
on between tax officials and private businessmen clearly leaves some 
unofficial margin for the businessmen, but how much is uncertain. 
Informed Indonesian academics estimate that those larger indigenous 
companies which do pay taxes pay roughly 10 percent to 40 percent of 
what the assessed tax should be according to law. With the possible 
exception of many trading enterprises, much of this windfall is appar­
ently being reinvested in Indonesia, particularly in urban housing 
and enterprises.
The selling of services at lower governmental levels represents 
an exchange of goods and services which in most cases actually permits 
a civil servant to perform his government function. Not only is this 
practice in harmony with traditional rural norms, but it allows low- 
salaried officials to remain on the job. Certainly at the subdistrict 
and village levels the practice of paying for services rendered con­
tinues in full force. Usually the payments are in kind and the 
proximity of the subdistrict officer's house to the local market 
facilitates the exchange. There seems to be little resistance to 
this practice, though some was encountered at the village level in 
West Sumatra.
The use of "speed money" may facilitate more rapid foreign invest­
ment. Forced to work through normal bureaucratic channels, it may 
take several months or longer for foreign enterprises to get the 
necessary agreement and permission to establish factories. Unofficial 
incentives may hasten the process with the result that operations 
begin considerably sooner, benefitting both Indonesia and the foreign 
investor. It appears that competition among Indonesian agencies for 
the privilege of negotiating or approving investment offers is so 
great that all benefits of using "speed money" are lost--and along 
with them, many of the offers and potential offers. However, once 
investment agreements have been signed, it seems probable that this 
form of bribery pays dividends in getting production going.
25. Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and
Private Incentives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967), pp. 110 and 193.
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Potential Costs
Capital accumulated through high-level corruption may be wasted. 
There is considerable evidence from Latin American dictatorships and 
more recently from Vietnam that much of the accumulated capital in 
those areas finds its way to West European banks, a practice not en­
tirely unknown in the United States. In such cases the loss for the 
country involved is obvious. As noted above, very little can be 
learned about this phenomenon in Indonesia. However, if there is a 
direct correlation between the flight of such capital and the in­
stability of a country's government (as we might reasonably suspect 
there is), Indonesia's present degree of political stability provides 
some basis for optimism.
Investment may be channeled into sectors such as construction, 
not because of economic profitability, but because it may thus be 
easier to hide corruption.26 It is probably indisputable that con­
struction contracts permit some "sharing" of resources, but it is 
almost impossible to begin to measure the amount of resource diversion 
caused by this. A careful review of building permits issued by 
offices of the public works department would provide clues, but not 
firm answers. The results of interviews carried out with several 
budgetary officials suggest that departments consistently attempt to 
hide increased personnel allocations in construction projects, but 
it seems overly rigid to regard this routine strategy as corruption.
Corruption may squander the important asset of political legiti­
macy which most governments seek to preserve and build on. One of 
the major tasks of any regime is the building of its own legitimacy, 
a resource which will enable it to gain more easily the support and 
the assistance of the public in connection with development (at the 
expenditure of fewer economic and political resources). It may or 
may not be true, but many Indonesians in the Outer Islands believe 
that most of the corruption in Indonesia is located in Djakarta. The 
fact that they believe this and that few serious steps have been 
taken to control corruption tends to reduce the legitimacy of the 
Central Government in their eyes.27
Corruption may tend to destroy some of a new nation's greatest 
potential assets, the enthusiasm, idealism and sympathy of its youth 
and students.28 In the event that the idealism and enthusiasm of the 
younger generation turns to cynicism, not only political stability 
but long run economic development efforts are bound to be affected.
The students will be the future political leaders and economic 
modernizers. The Djakarta demonstrations of January 1970 indicate 
the reality of this concern in the capital. Some preliminary data 
from university students in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Java suggest that 
most Indonesian students are aware of the problem and critical of 
corruption in the government.
26. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development," p. 421.
27. Based on interviews with government officials in West Sumatra and 
South Sulawesi.
28. Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption in Developing 
Countries (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963).
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University Student Response to the Question: 
"Have you ever discussed the problem 
of corruption with anyone?"
TABLE VII(a)
Yes. No No Response
447 80.7% 101 18.2% 6 1.1%
TABLE VII(b)
University Student Response to the Question: 
"In your opinion does corruption constitute 
an important problem in connection 
with economic development?"
Yes No Don't Know No Response
529 95.5% 11 2.0% 7 1.3% 7 1.3%
In sum, students seem to discuss corruption and they seem to be con­
cerned about its impact on economic development. In response to 
another question in which they were asked to identify the main 
problems facing Indonesia today, a surprising number mentioned the 
problem of corruption first.29
Corruption may alienate civil servants and cause them to reduce 
their efforts and support for the government's policies. The loyalty 
and enthusiasm of capable, government officials is a desirable 
resource for any regime to have. But such loyalty is never guaranteed 
and the literature on bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies, as 
distinct sectors of the polity, can sometimes be very effective in 
their demands. How does corruption in Indonesia's government affect 
its civil servants? There are no good measurements of the support
29. The student interviews were divided evenly among three provincial 
universities: Andalas (West Sumatra), Hasanuddin (South Sulawesi),
and Diponegoro (Central Java). Third-year students from the 
faculties of medicine, economics, law, agriculture, and the 
social sciences were selected as respondents. The responses are 
all the more significant in that most of them were given prior 
to January 1970, when corruption became a national political 
issue.
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which Indonesian civil servants give to their government, but again 
some data suggest that corruption is a matter of much concern to 
them. Table VIII(a) indicates that the subject is widely discussed; 
Table VIII(b) shows a surprising number of officials who have dis­
cussed the problem of corruption with their superiors; and Table 
VIII (c) reflects a broad, general concern over corruption in relation 
to economic development.
TABLE VIII(a)
Civil Servant Response to the Question: "Have
you ever discussed corruption with anyone?"
Type of Regional 
Civil Servant Ves
No or 
Not Yet
No
Response
Economic Planners (54) 50 3 1
92% 6%
Higher Level (157) 113 41 3
72% 26%
Lower Level (146) 90 49 7
62% 33%
Totals (357) 253 93 11
Percent 71% 26% 3%
TABLE VI11(b)
Civil Servant Response to the Question: "If
you have discussed corruption, with whom?"*
Type of Regional 
Civil Servant Superior Subordinate Family Colleagues Friends
Economic Planners 
(54)
19 19 25 43 29
Higher Level
(157)
35 28 34 71 54
Lower Level
(146)
17 17 20 50 53
Totals 71 64 79 164 136
* Note: Multiple Responses were Permitted.
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Civil Servant Response to the Question: "In
your opinion does corruption constitute 
an important problem in connection 
with economic development?"
TABLE VIII(c)
Type of Regional 
Civil Servant Yes No
Don't
Know
No
Response
Economic Planners (54) 52 0 1 1
96% 0%
Higher Level (157) 152 2 0 3
97% 1%
Lower Level (146) 130 9 0 7
89% 6%
Totals (357) 334 11 1 11
Percent 94% 3% 3%
Though not shown here, the data are consistent across the three 
provinces of West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. Nearly 
all officials are unhappy with present levels of corruption; some 
are angry that stronger measures have not yet been taken to lessen 
the frequency and amount of corruption. The data also suggest that 
there is general receptivity to increased control mechanisms should 
they be introduced.
Conclusions
Contrary to the views of Furnivall and others, corruption (by 
its current definition} was widespread in the Netherlands Indies.
The legal system imposed by the Dutch left traditional patrimonial 
relationships largely untouched. For the Dutch to have destroyed 
them through attempts at direct rule would have resulted in chaos. 
Thus the "abuses" of the patrimonial system persisted through the 
colonial period and because social norms do not change as rapidly as 
statutory law, many of them continue today.
Given these traditions, the stimulus of low salaries, and ex­
panded government functions, it is obvious that major investments 
would be required if a decision were to be made today to eradicate 
corruption. What kind of investments? Direct investments in govern­
mental salaries, legal institutions, political parties, education, 
control mechanisms, and possibly even structural changes in the 
bureaucracy. The magnitude of these investments can best be under­
stood by isolating one variable, that of government salaries and 
benefits. A doubling of salaries and benefits would require a total 
personnel expenditure in the neighborhood of Rp. 400 billion--con­
siderably more than total domestic revenues at present.30 Even
30. Revenues for fiscal year 1969-1970 were Rp. 309.4 billion, or
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if salary increases of this magnitude were feasible, there are many 
other important variables affecting the incidence of corruption and 
only part of the problem would be solved.
On the whole, corruption in Indonesia appears to present more 
of a recurring political problem than an economic one. It undermines 
the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the young, educated 
elite and most civil servants. In the case of the latter, it is 
assumed, but cannot be proven, that certain types of corruption 
substantially reduce bureaucratic productivity. Furthermore, scores 
of interview responses indicate that corruption reduces support for 
the government among elites at the province and regency level. Final­
ly, the survey data suggest that concern over the problem of corrup­
tion runs much deeper than is superficially apparent.
The Suharto government has adopted a low-cost strategy to cope 
with the problem. High civilian and military officials must now 
list their personal wealth annually;31 new anti-corruption laws have 
been proposed; selected state organizations are being investigated; 
and the President has obligated himself to "lead the fight" personal­
ly. The strategy is a realistic one which is designed to meet immedi­
ate political demands and short-range objectives.
But corruption will continue to recur as a political issue, 
requiring additional investments by the government. Because much 
of the indigenous concern over corruption in Indonesia is at present 
latent or unexpressed, there is good reason to believe that with the 
further development of political parties, the press, and associational 
interest groups, investments to limit corrupt practices will need to 
be larger in the future.
about $818.5 million. A doubling of government salaries would 
provide a college-educated bureau chief with an increase to only 
$80 from the present $40 per month. Most civil servants and 
military personnel would receive much less. Data on revenues 
were obtained from "Pelaksanaan Tahun Pertama Repelita," an 
appendix to the President’s National Day speech, August 16, 1970, 
p . 72.
34. Presidential Decision, Number 52, August 3, 1970.
